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2009年10月31日 上午5點43分35秒The Battle of Kadesh, Part II
The Traditional Account
Traditionally, the story of the Battle of Kadesh begins with the army of Ramesses II advancing upon the city of Kadesh in four corps. Ramesses II himself was with the lead element of the corps, known as Amun. While crossing the River Orontes (Arnath) to begin the approach to the city from the south, two Bedouin tribesmen, secretly in the employ of the Hittite king, led what appears to have been a gullible Ramesses the Great into believing that the Hittite army was many miles away to the north. Ramesses II, believing he had stolen a strategic advantage, having arrived on the battle grounds early, ordered the army of Amun onward without delay. 
However, after making camp to the northwest of Kadesh, Ramesses II was rather unnerved to discover from captured enemy scouts that the Hittite army had already arrived. Located behind the Kadesh tell, they were even now ready for battle. Hearing this news, Ramesses II sent his vizier to the army (really, more of a division) of Re some miles back to hurry them forward. However, they were ambushed by 2,500 Hittite chariots as they crossed the plain of Kadesh and so were overcome. This force then wheeled north and attacked Ramesses II's encampment, overrunning them as well. Though many of Amun's troops panicked and abandoned Ramesses to his fate, the Pharaoh donned his armor and from his chariot, almost single handedly held off the Hittite chariotry inflicting heavy losses on them. However, Ramesses II may really have been saved by the vision of booty within his camp, which seems to have occupied the enemy troops.
Overseeing the battle and observing the fate of his original chariot attack, the Hittite king ordered a further 1,000 chariots into the battle arena. However, just as these additional warriors reached the battle front, Ramesses II was saved by the arrival of the Ne'arin. This was a second body of troops that Ramesses II had detached from the main campaign and ordered to approach Kadesh from the north. With the aid of these troops, Ramesses II was able to fend off the Hittite attack and win the battle, leaving many of the enemy dead on the battle field and the survivors faced with the humiliation of having to swim back across the Orontes River to escape the wrath of the Pharaoh. 
Some accounts of the battle have the two warring parties facing off once again the next day, but the ultimate results of the contest was a truce, after which the Egyptians and Hittites withdrew to their respective homelands (Ramesses II, having crushed his enemies).
The above is basically the Egyptian account of the Battle of Kadesh, and it probably does provide a framework for the overall action, though over the years, hardly any detail has escaped the attention of analysts. Though the battle may indeed be the earliest military action recorded in detail, there are many specifics that are either missing or are subject to considerable debate. In fact, Ramesses II certainly presented the battle with an obvious prejudice, particularly towards his own actions and deeds, but indeed, even the main three sources that we have of the battle, consisting of a poem, bulletin and reliefs, even disagree on some of the facts, and the scattered information derived from Hittite sources only confuse the matter additionally.
Prelude to the Battle of Kadesh
The Battle of Kadesh fought by Ramesses II was a long time in the making, and not the first to be fought between the Hattities and Egyptians over this small, but strategically located vassal state. Ramesses II had probably accompanied his father, Seti I on one similar campaign prior to his ascending the throne of Egypt. However, though Seti I may have taken Kadesh, by the time of Ramesses II's reign, it was back in the hands of the Hattities.
From the onset of Ramesses II's reign, it is apparent that he intended to renew the struggle for domination in southern Syria, and so almost immediately he began preparing for the coming hostilities. He added a fourth field army to his military establishment, and expanded the eastern Delta city of Pi-Ramasses, his new capital, to act as a staging point for operations in the Levant.
In his fourth year, during the spring of 1301 BC, Ramesses led his army into southern Syria for the first time as king, reaching as far as Simyra and succeeding in returning the Amurru kingdom to the Egyptian fold. 
Map of the General Region
It soon became evident to the Hittite king, Muwatallish, that in order to protect his holdings in Syria, he would have to confront the Egyptians in a major military campaign. The venue of this coming battle was never in doubt by either party. They would meet beneath the walls of Kadesh in order to settle once and for all the future of their respective empires in Syria.
In fact, it is likely that the Hittites and the Egyptians agreed on the site, as well as the time of battle in advance. Certainly, there is an inference of this considering that the two sides arrived on the scene of Kadesh at about the same time during the month of May, 1300 BC. It should be noted however that this was not an ideal battleground for the Egyptians. The Hittites were operating in a region that was under their control where their supply lines were short. They probably staged their campaign out of Carchemish, not far from Kadesh at all. Furthermore, the city of Kadesh, currently under their command, was large enough to accommodate the Hittite army should matters go awry. It provided a good defensive position, surrounded by both a mote and the Orontes River itself.
Ramesses II would also have to contend with one of the largest armies ever assembled by the kingdom of Hatti. Though no substantiating sources have ever been unearthed, Ramesses speaks of the Hittites having eighteen allied and vassal states providing some 3,700 chariots and 37,000 infantry. We know that these included Aleppo, Khatti, Naharin, Arzawa, Dardany, Keshkesh, Masa, Pidassa, Arwen (?), Karkisha, Luke, Carchemish, Ugarit, Dedy, Nuhashshe, Mushanet, Kadesh as well as the country of Kizwadna (Kizzuwadna), whom he commissioned to:
"...send one hundred horses equipped (with chariots) and a thousand foot soldiers to the army of the Sun, who will provide for them."
Throughout the months of March and April, Pi-Ramasses must have been a beehive of activity, as individual units were mustered into the four field armies (also sometimes referred to as divisions in some texts). One sign of times to come was the notable increase in the number of foreign troops in the regular Egyptian army. These included Nubians, Sherden, Libyans and Canaanites. The four armies were each made up of about 5,000 troops, for a total of 20,000 combatants. While no mention is actually made of the army's chariot strength, by this date the Egyptians should have been able to muster a significant force.
Ramesses left Egypt in April, probably taking the coast road to Gaza. It was there that Ramesses sent the Ne'arin, probably an elite unit, northward from Gaza along the coast road to Canaan, probably to secure the loyalty of the Canaanite coastal cities. On a specific day, they were probably ordered to arrive at Kadesh by way of the Eleutheros Valley in Amurru. The main body of his forces followed the route inland through Canaan, traversing the eastern side of Lake Galilee afterwards entering the Bekaa Valley in order to reach Kumidi. 
Ramesses II had arrived near Kadesh and was encamped with the army of Amun about one day's march south from Kadesh. The location of their camp has been identified as a high, conspicuous mound known as Kamuat el-Harmel. We are actually not certain about the day that Ramesses II arrived at this location, but rather that he was at the camp on the ninth day of the month of Shemu (late May). The other three armies, named P'Re (Re), Ptah and Sutekh (Set), lay to the rear of the army of Amun, each separated by a distance of about 10.5 kilometers (one iter). While Ramesses II has been criticized for this division of his forces, it was standard operating procedure to distance the armies in this manner.
Unfortunately, we have no further specific references to time within the accounts of the battle, and many military analysts believe that the following events may have occurred over a broader length of time than what the fluid accounts of the battle might lead us to believe.
First Encounters with the Enemy
Ramesses II and the Army of Amun began to strike camp on the ninth day in order to cross the Orontes probably by the ford at Shabtuna (or nearby). It must have taken some considerable period of time for this to have been effected. Five thousand men, perhaps along with additional (and probably, considering the retinue that followed the King, substantial) support personnel, their equipment, including chariots, had to move down the ridge through the Labwi (Robawi) forest and ponderously cross the Orontes. This all probably took a great deal of time and even if the Army of Amun broke camp (a major undertaking in itself) early on the ninth day, they probably did not complete the crossing until at least mid-afternoon. 
Shortly after the crossing, two Shasu Bedouin were encountered and brought before the pharaoh. It has been generally assumed that they were a deliberate plant by the Hittite king to misinform Ramesses II, and indeed, they informed him that the Hittite army was some distance to the north in the land of Aleppo.
In bronze age encounters, this would have given Ramesses II considerable advantage. One of the most important aspects of such a battle, after a long march by opposing armies, was a period of rest and reorganization for battle readiness. Ramesses obviously took considerable assurance that he was in a superior position to the Hittite forces, and even the Egyptian accounts of the campaign do not attempt to hide his gullibility on this matter. However, historians may be too quick to lay blame on Ramesses II. The king clearly followed normal army operating procedures, and it was common for a screening force of chariots or horsemen to move ahead of the marching army. This advanced element was either absent, or may have shared the overconfidence of the pharaoh, but in any event, it would not have been the task of the king to oversee every operation of his army, for he had senior officers for that purpose.
At any rate, the Army of Amun arrived in a somewhat casual manner at their campsite on the plains of Kadesh, northwest of the city, perhaps late on the ninth day, not realizing that the entire Hittite army was camped on the opposite side of the Kadesh mound. While we do not know the precise location of his camp, it is likely that he used the same site as that of Seti I some years before. The Egyptian's no doubt set up camp with the expectations of an extended stay, for at the center of the camp they erected a shrine to the god Amun, together with the great tent of the pharaoh where Ramesses II "took his seat on a throne of gold".
Certainly it seems that if reconnaissance of any manner was ordered previously it was ineffectual, but now the Egyptian scouts made good by returning with two prisoners found lurking near the Egyptian camp. Refusing at first to talk, they were beaten before being dragged before Rameses II. The historical documents record that:
"Then said His Majesty, 'What are you'? They replied, 'We belong to the ruler of Hatti! He sent us out to see where Your Majesty was.' Said His Majesty to them, 'Where is he, the Ruler of Hatti? See, I heard it said that he was in the land of Aleppo, north of Tunip.' They replied, 'Behold, the Ruler of Hatti has already come, together with many foreign lands that he brought as allies...See, they are poised armed and ready to fight behind Old Kadesh?'"
It must have been a great shock to Ramesses II, who, only moments before, had figured he held an advantage to his adversary, having arrived on the plain of Kadesh first. As the full implications of this new information sank in, Ramesses must have understood that he and his army stared absolute disaster in the face. Not only was the Hittite army rested and ready for battle, but he had arrived at Kadesh with only a small part of his overall forces.
A conference was quickly called with his senior staff, where the king revealed to them their dire predicament. This resulted in the realization that all would be lost unless their forces could be quickly consolidated, and therefore, the king's vizier was quickly sent south in order to implement a rapid advance by Egypt's other forces. However, at this point the events that follow become somewhat difficult to recount.
if indeed the Egyptian Army left their camp and crossed the Orontes River on the ninth day, then it must have been somewhat late that day that the Hittite scouts were discovered, and even later by the time they were handed over to Ramesses after being tortured. Some authorities believe therefore that the vizier would not have reached the closest forces to Ramesses, the Army of Re, until the morning of the tenth day. However, that army had probably advanced northward just as the Army of Amun had, camping perhaps in the same location that the Ramesses II had occupied previous to his crossing of the Orontes. Hence, it is very possible that the vizier did in fact reach the southern forces late on the day of the ninth.
The Forces Engage
We know that the Army of Re mustered their forces and, as soon as they could break camp, attempted to close ranks with the Army of Amun as the vizier continued south in order to warn Egypt's other forces. Soon the Army of Re was crossing the River Orontes but Ramesses II would be disappointed if he expected their timely arrival. However, whether this division of the Egyptian army crossed the River late on the nine day of the month of Shemu or early on the tenth day is open to speculation. regardless, what transpired next could not have been as much of a surprise as the ancient text makes of it. 
As the Army of Re crossed the Orontes River, they were set upon by Hittite chariotry, who emerged from the tree line to the right of the column about three quarters of a mile distant. However, it should be noted that some time must have elapsed between the dispatch of the vizier and the Army of Re's crossing of the Orontes. They, along with the Army of Amun under the direct command of Ramesses, had some period of time to prepare themselves for the ensuing hostilities, for it must have taken time for the vizier to both have reached and warned the army of Re, as well for that division to have struck camp and crossed the Orontes.
Yet, this apparently did not prevent the destruction that followed. Having emerged from their cover the Hittite chariots crashed into the Army of Re, as they had been trained, causing widespread havoc. Many, if not most Egyptologists disagree with Ramesses stated figure of 2,500 chariots, for this would have been an overwhelming force that, first of all, would have required a significant time to cross over the Orontes but having succeeded, could have very likely decimated all of the Egyptian forces. For this reason, many analysts believe that the Hittite chariot forces that attacked the Army of Re were much smaller, perhaps only one fifth of the size documented by the Egyptians. This could explain much of what happened next. However, it must also be remembered that by this point, half of the Egyptian forces, consisting of some ten thousand men, along with half of the Egyptian chariotry were now on the plains of Kadesh, so the force of Hittite chariots may have been substantial given the initial destruction that was caused. Furthermore, the Hittite forces may not have had to cross over the Orontes proper, but rather a fairly small tributary.
Certainly the Hittite chariots scattered the Army of Re, but probably did not actually decimate it. After crashing through the ranks of the Egyptian column, they wheeled to the north following the vanguard of this division as they rushed to the perceived safety of the Amun lines. The army of Amun had little time to secure a combat stance, but given the alarming information provided by the Hittite scouts, they must have been in a state of readiness to some extent. It is doubtful that the column of Re, which probably stretched on for some two and one half miles, was completely overcome by the Hittite attack. As the remnants of the Army of Re approached the camp of Amun, followed in hot pursuit by the Hittite chariotry, lookouts should have seen the advancing storm, signaled by the dust plume created by such a disturbance, and alerted at least some of the camp to the impending battle. 
Nevertheless, the Hittite chariots very quickly crashed through the front lines of Ramesses II's camp, but were quickly slowed by the impending obstacles of such a large camp. Even so, they created widespread panic amongst these troops as well, scattering the forces as they had evidently done with the army of Re. Yet, pharaoh had been alerted by this time to the attack, and in what seems to have been a rather cool, collected effort on his part, first instructed his court, which probably included a few princes, on their defense, and then proceeded to dress himself in armor and prepare his immediate guard for a battle which he would heroically lead.
By this time, the Hittite chariotry forces were concentrated within the camp and perhaps at a point where they had become somewhat disorganized. They were probably also in a position where maneuverability of their much larger chariots was difficult because of obstacles within the camp. Further, after attacking the Re column and wheeling northward for the camp of Amun, their horses must have surely been exhausted. Doubtless, they had even lost a few of their kind in the running battle that was even now continuing.
Now, it was Ramesses II who:
":...appeared in glory like his father Montu, he assumed the accoutrements of battle, and he girded himself with his corslet"
However, before engaging in the battle, he sought safety for his family members that traveled with him, but thereafter, in a fit of valor, Ramesses II's, together with his personal guard, attacked the charging Hittite forces and, with the superior maneuverability of their chariots, wheeled about in successive attacks on the slower forces of the Hittites.
We are told by Ramesses II that:
"I found the 2,500 chariots, in whose midst I was, sprawling before my horse. Not one of them found his hand to fight...and they were unable to shoot. They found not their hearts to seize their javelins."
The results were that the Egyptians began to pick off the overextended Hittite chariotry. Of course, the fact that the Hittite forces could be dealt with at this point by what was apparently only a fairly small force of Egyptians is another reason why historians believe that there were less then 2,500 chariots in the Hittite attack. However, Ramesses II tells us that he:
"caused them to plunge into the water (of the River Orontes), even as crocodiles plunge, fallen upon their faces. I killed among them according as I willed". 
However, there may have also been a somewhat larger number of Egyptian forces who stood against the Hittite forces rather than running in the cowardly manner that the reliefs depict. It is difficult to imagine, having been warned of their dire circumstances by the Hittite scouts, that the Amun camp was not highly alert and that the five thousand troops of that division were not in a state of battle readiness. It is more than somewhat likely, given his vanity on such matters, that Ramesses II empathized his own heroism on the walls of his temples at the expense of his armed forces.
Irregardless, the Hittite forces began to lose their initial advantage. Overlooking the battle scene along with the nobles and high officials who had accompanied the Hittite army, Muwatallish monarch appears to have been shaken by the Egyptian recovery that he witnessed within the running battle at Ramesses II's camp. In order to save his dwindling forces, he ordered another thousand chariots to the attack. This force appears to have consisted of the high nobles who surrounded the king. However, several pieces of information should be closely examined at this point.
First, it is argued that this second force could not have been as great as one thousand chariots, for the logistics of quickly sending that large of force immediately into battle would have been difficult, if not impossible. However, the fact that the nobility within the Hittite forces were now sent into battle also suggests that the initial commitment of Hittite chariotry must have been substantial. Though perhaps not as many as 2,500 chariots, it seems to have left the Hittites with only the elite nobility in reserve. 
Secondly, it has been suggested by highly authoritative sources that the initial chariot attack was actually unintentional. Some scholars believe that the Hittite chariots may have simply been scouting the Egyptian forces, but when they broke from the scrub trees and saw the Army of Re, they had little choice other than crashing through the Egyptian column. These analysts argue that, had the attack been intentional with a force as large as 2,500 chariots, they could have and should have completely decimated the Egyptian forces. 
However, the fact that Muwatallish was in fact observing the battle with forces ready to reinforce the initial chariot attack, seems to indicate that the battle was no accident, though many questions do remain on this matter. For example, during the entire event, no Hittite infantry seem to have ever been committed to the battle, which leaves us with an awkward gap in our understanding of the battle.
As the Hittite reinforcements entered the fray, the Egyptian forces must have themselves been exhausted from their initial encounter with the enemy forces. If they were aware of the second wave of Hittite chariotry as they charged the camp, the men surrounding Ramesses II must have surely felt doomed. However, Ramesses II seems to have been a lucky man throughout his long life, and now he was particularly fortuitous. As the Hittite forces approached the Egyptian camp, suddenly, and seemingly out of nowhere, the Ne'arin appeared, turning the impending disaster into a route of the Hittite forces. 
It is probable that the Hittites did not know about the Ne'arin. This term means "young men" and infers that they were perhaps a crack Canaanite unit who's loyalty to Ramesses II was beyond reproach. It has been suggested that, rather than an elite unit, this may have actually been the Army of Set, though the reliefs indicate otherwise. It was probably no accident that they showed up at this point, though the exact timing was certainly lucky. These forces had probably been ordered to join up with the main body of the Egyptian army on a specific day.
Nevertheless, the Hittite forces were sent scurrying back across the Orontes river and we are told that many nobles and men of importance within the Hittite confederation lay dead on the battle field, or were swept away by the river in their panicked retreat.
The next day, there may have been some additional fighting according to some accounts, but this may have also referenced the lashing that Ramesses II would give his troops for their cowardly actions. In the reliefs documenting the battle, Ramesses II states that:
"None of you was there...None rose to lend me his hand in my fight...None of you came later to tell the story of his heroic deeds in Egypt...The foreigners who saw me, praise my name to the end of all lands where I was not known...Since ancient times a man was honored for his fighting abilities, but I will not reward any of you, as you have abandoned me when I was alone fighting my enemies."
It has even been suggested that, even as Muwatallish overlooked the scene, Ramesses II may have dispatched a number of his troops to the netherworld.
More importantly, what happened next almost negates the resounding victory claimed by Ramesses II. He agreed to a truce with the Hittite King, who we are told pleaded with Ramesses II stating:
"Suteh are you, Baal himself, your anger burns like fire in the land of Hatti... our servant speaks to you and announces that you are the son of Re. He put all the lands into your had, united as one. The land of Kemi, the land of Hatti, are at your service. They are under your feet. Re, your exalted father, gave them to you so you would rule us. It is good that you should kill your servants?... Look at what you have done yesterday. You have slaughtered thousands of your servants....You will not leave any inheritance. Do not rob yourself of your property, powerful king. glorious in battle, give us breath in our nostrils."
Of course, this text obviously offers a view by the Egyptians. It may be that both parties to the truce realized that additional battles might have decimated both armies to the extent that they may ver well have become vulnerable to other powers within the region. Furthermore, Ramesses II was obviously facing a crises within the ranks, so we are told that:
"His Majesty turned back in peace to Egypt, together with his infantry and his chariotry being with him"
Ramesses II later signed a peace treaty with the Hittites which would forever place Kadesh out of Egyptian hands. From this, it is evident that no real victory took place, or at least not one that gave Ramesses II an obvious edge over his enemies. In fact, it would seem that the Hittites army even shadowed the Egyptian forces as they headed home. 
A drawing of the reliefs at the Temple of Luxor depicting the Battle of Kadesh.
The bottom register shows Ramesses II single-handedly charging the enemey
Eventually, what Ramesses II failed to do to the Hittites would be accomplished instead by the Sea People, who would infiltrate the Hittite lands and eventually cause that empire to collapse. But for now, the Hittites were no longer Egypt's great enemy, for later, Ramesses II would take perhaps several of Hattusilis III's (successor to Muwatallish) daughters as his queens and there would be much correspondence between the two courts.
See Also ::::
The Battle of Kadesh, Part I
2009年10月31日 上午5點41分56秒The Battle of Kadesh, Part I
The Battle of Kadesh is one of the most well known military campaigns of history because it is the earliest battle that can be reliably reconstructed in detail from various records on both sides of the conflict. Fought between Ramesses II, one of Egypt's best known pharaohs, and the Hittites under Muwatallish (along with a number of allies), this battle over control of Syrian territory has received considerable attention by many analysts over the years.
However, in order to completely understand this historical event, it is necessary to examine the history that led up to this famous battle, for it was very literally hundreds of years in the making.
From almost the beginning of recorded history, Egypt was active in the Levant region of southern Syria, particularly at the port of Byblos, where the earliest inspirational evidence of an Egyptian king was that of Khasekhemwy of Egypt's 2nd Dynasty. From that time onward, Egypt had some involvement in the region, if only in the realms of diplomacy and trade.
However, over an extended period of time, the great powers of the Ancient Near East sought to control Syria in order to exploit the economic resources and trade of the region. Syria was the cross roads of world commerce during Egypt's New Kingdom, where goods from the Aegean and beyond entered the Near East by way of ports such as Ugarit. The ships that docked in these ports dominated maritime trade in the eastern Mediterranean. They carried a rich variety of goods, including copper, tin, chemicals, tools, glass ingots, ivory, faience, jewelry, luxury goods, timber, textiles foodstuff together with other products that were then distributed throughout the Near East and beyond over a network of extensive trade routes. In turn, these same land routes were used by traders who brought raw material such as precious metals, tin, copper, lapis lazuli and other merchandise from as far away as Iran and Afghanistan to sell in the Syrian markets.
Hence, it is easy to understand Egypt's involvement in the region. However, though Senusret III (12th Dynasty), seems to have fought one campaign in southern Syria culminating in the capture of the City of Shechem, the early Egyptian's appear to have been, for the most part, rather indifferent regarding this important region. But beginning with Senusret III, who operating out of the new northern capital named Itjtawy established by Amenemhat I in the area of Lisht, the scene was set for a more vigorous foreign policy. Regular envoys began to be sent to such Syrian city-states as Ugarit and Byblos, and there was both an increase in foreign trade and in the fortification of Egypt's northeastern frontier. Overall however, the Egyptian policy in the Levant during the Egypt's Middle Kingdom was relatively naive, ultimately resulting in the Second Intermediate Period.
By the 18th Dynasty, Egyptian rulers were adapting a more mature approach to international relations and as early as the reign of Ahmose, who founded the New Kingdom, they began laying down the foundations of an Asiatic empire by campaigning in southern Syria. At the same time, there was an increase in the use of diplomacy resulting in a framework of alliances and treaties.
The ancient Near East had an early, strong tradition by which power blocks were built and maintained. There were basically two types of treaties as early as the second millennium BC, distinguished by the Akkadian terms, riksu (a parity treaty) and ade (essentially an oath of loyalty or vassal treaty). While Egypt would become deeply involved in the southern Syria, the use of Akkadian and Babylonian dialects as the primary language of these treaties and related correspondence, however, suggests that Egypt was simply absorbed into an existing network of international diplomacy, the origins of which probably lay in Mesopotamia.
During Egypt's New Kingdom, Syrian control was synonymous with "world" power among the predatory empires that sought to use the region's wealth for their own benefit. Hence, over a period of several hundred hears, Egypt, and their primary enemies in the region, Mitanni and Hatti, among other empires, applied considerable effort, including bloody warfare, to control this vitally strategic region. While the motivation of the various "great powers" of the region are clear, more specifically, we can examine more specifically the events that ultimately culminated in Egypt's last and best known Battle of Kadesh against the Hittites.
By the time of Tuthmosis III of Egypt's 18th Dynasty, Egypt controlled a considerable region in Southern Syria. However, one of the principal conflicts leading up to this peace with Mitanni was the Battle of Megiddo, where Tuthmosis III squashed a revolt by city-states led by the prince of Kadesh, though backed by Mitanni, Egypt's principal rival in the Levant. However, this was only the first of seventeen campaigns that Tuthmosis III would eventually undertake. Tuthmosis III, sometimes known as the Napoleon of Egypt, backed up his military achievements in the region with a network of garrisons and numerous vassal treaties. Taking a long view of the regions strategic importance, he returned from his campaigns with 36 sons of Lavant chiefs, holding them hostage but also indoctrinating them with Egyptian traditions. They were later returned to their homelands as puppet rulers. This eventually resulted a long term perception by Egypt that southern Syria was a permanent Egyptian territory.
During the reign of Tuthmosis IV (1425-1417 BC), Egypt signed a peace treaty that ended hostilities for really the first time since the aggressive military campaigns of Tuthmosis I, Tuthmosis III and his successor, Amenhotep II, who greatly expanded Egypt's territories in Syria.
It was the early revival of the Hittite kingdom that forced Mitanni to make peace with Egypt in order to avert a war on two fronts, though the treaty also served Egypt, which had witnessed a progressive loss of ground to Mitanni in Syria after Tuthmosis III. Tuthmosis IV, Amenhotep II's successor concluded the peace treaty when he married the daughter of the Mitanni king, Artatama. The essence of this peace treaty was that it specifically set the border between the two empires in central Syria. Among other territories, it gave to Egypt Amurru, the Eleutheros valley and Kadesh. In return, the Egyptians gave up their claims to land that had, during the reigns of Tuthmosis I and Tuthmosis III, been held by Egypt.
After the peace treaty was established, both Egypt and Mitanni seem to have prospered and indeed, this period established the wealth of Egypt's New Kingdom, as tribute flowed in from the Canaanite possessions. For some three decades, goods flowed unimpeded along the grade routes as the region enjoyed relative tranquillity.
Egypt depended on the Eleutheros valley, which crossed the territory known as Amurru, in order to access their Syrian holdings along the Orontes River. This same route was earlier used by the Egyptian armies as they marched on the Mitanni possessions in northern Syria prior to the peace treaty. To the Egyptians, the Eleutheros valley was of essential strategic importance, but in order to maintain this route, the city state of Kadesh, which dominated the western end of the Valley and that laid astride the main Egyptian invasion route into northern Syria, also had to be under Egyptian control. Though the Egyptians had given up their claims in Northern Syria under the Tuthmosis IV's peace treaty, if ever their imperial aspirations in that region were revived, Kadesh would be needed. It was the importance of Kadesh and Amurru that would eventually lead to the ultimate conflict between Egypt and Hatti.
However, the trouble did not begin with the Hittites, but rather with the emergence of a nascent political entity in Amurru. The territory of Amurru had not been a legitimate kingdom when the peace treaty was signed, but under the strong leadership of Abdi-Ashirta, and later his son Aziru, the inhabitants of this region formed at least enough of a coherence that, by the end of the 14th century BC, they were able to form a kingdom stretching between the Mediterranean Sea and the Orontes valley.
Being clever fellows, abdi-Ashirta and his son, while professing loyalty to their overlord Amenhotep III in Egypt, took advantage that pharaoh's relative indifference to Egypt's holdings in the region by expanding the new Amurru kingdom at the expense of a number of his neighbors. Even when these small states, who were vassals of Egypt, protested to the pharaoh, their complaints went unanswered by action. The matter became so serious in fact that Mitanni deemed it necessary to take military action in order to keep this nominally Egyptian vassal under control. Egypt did eventually send a military expedition to the area, and for a while, the problems created by Amurru were removed by the death of Abdi-Ashirta. However, the stage was set for wider, and more problematic troubles.
During the first half of the 14th century BC, the Hittites, under the powerful rule of their king, Suppiluliumas, began to seriously demolish the position of the Kingdom of Mitanni in northern Syria, resulting in the unraveling of the international status quo that had existed since the peace treaty of Tuthmosis IV. Suppiluliumas ascended the Hittite throne in approximately 1380 BC, and almost immediately began to assert a Hittite claim to Syria. At first, he attacked territories held by Mitanni, of course creating open hostilities between the two empires. He began by invading and conquering the small states of Aleppo, Alalakh, Nuhashshe and Tunip in northern Syria. When the Mitanni rulers attempted to reestablish their control in the region, the Hittite monarch used this as an excuse for a second Syrian war. Suppiluliumas declared these former Mitannian vassal states to be rebels. However, rather than attacking them, he crossed over the River Euphrates and marched directly south, campaigning against the Mitanni empire directly. In a rapid military action, he surprised the Mitanni army so badly that he was able to occupied and sacked the capital, Washukkanni.
Only then did he turn west, crossing over the Euphrates once again to enter Syria, where his true objectives lay. Now, there was little in the way of a Mitanni empire to stand in his way, so the Syrian states rapidly fell, one after the other, to the Hittites. Suppiluliumas lists them as Aleppo, Mukish, Niya, Arakhtu, Qatna and Nuhashshe. In the processes, Egypt let slip away the important Ugarit port (reportedly without battle) and the strategically essential Kadesh, and without even a fight.
These campaigns occurred during the reign of Amenhotep IV, better known to most as Akhenaten. Certainly this pharaoh must have been focused on his new religion revolving around the Aten (sun disk), and critics have used his inaction on this matter as evidences of his disinterest in Egypt's Asiatic empire. In reality though, Egypt's relationship with the Mitanni empire had cooled considerably in the previous few years, and so the ruler cared little about the events in northern Syria outside his holdings. Furthermore, the Hittite king had also made it clear beforehand that his campaign was directed against Mitanni and its Syrian dependencies only.
In fact, it was the Kadesh king himself, by unilaterally attempting to halt the Hittite advance southward under the belief that he was acting in the interests of his Egyptian overlord, which forced Suppiluliumas to capture the city. Most of the leaders of the city, including the king and his son, Aitakama, were carried off to Hattusas (Hattushash, modern Boghazkoy in Turkey), the Hittite capital. However, in order to demonstrate their claim of having no design on Egyptian territory, Aitakama was returned to Kadesh, where he renewed the city's status as an Egyptian vassal.
This seems though, to have been a ruse. Upon Aitakama return, other Egyptian vassal cities began to report attempts on his part to subvert them to the Hittite side. In fact, Aitakama even attacked Upe, an Egyptian vassal. Still, Egypt's only response to this situation was to charge Aziru, the ruler of Amurru, to protect the pharaoh's interests in the region. Of course, this only gave Aziru the opportunity to exploit the Egyptians once again, as his father had done, by expanding Amurru's borders at the expense of his neighboring vassal states. In fact, word finally reached Egypt that Aziru too was flirting with the Hitties, and had even entertained envoys sent by Suppiluliumas.
Finally, a demand was made for Aziru to present himself at the Egyptian court, while Kadesh was declared to be in revolt. Aziru reluctantly agreed to travel to the court of Akhenaten where his was forced to stay for several years. Military action was now clearly called for, and though there is little in the way of documentary evidence, most historians believe that Akhenaten did indeed send troops to attack Kadesh. However, this action apparently failed, though the recovery of Kadesh became the focus of Egyptian military efforts down until the time of Ramesses II of Egypt's 19th Dynasty.
However, regardless of how important Egypt's holdings in Syria might have appeared to earlier and later rulers, the Nilotic kingdom utterly failed to maintain any type of balance of power in the region. Suppiluliumas began to consolidate his position in the region by placing Aleppo, as well as Carchemish which had by now also fallen to the Hittites, under the rule of his sons. Thereafter, they set about establishing their own armies so that the loyalty of the Hittite vassal states in Syria could be closely controlled. Hence, there was considerably military presence in Syria, countered by almost no Egyptian counter forces. When the pharaoh though that Aziru's loyalties were firmly with the Egyptians, he was finally released, but with the balance of power in the region obviously on the side of the Hittites, he quickly revoked his vassal oath to Egypt for the protection of Suppiluliumas.
Now, Kadesh and Amurru, together with the Eleutheros valley were lost to the Egyptians, but while the Hittites may have come to view this as their permanent territory, the Egyptians never shared that view, and as the military men of the late 18th and early 19th Dynasty came to the throne, there was no doubt that they would seek to regain what was lost.
Unfortunately, any such ambition was muted in the face of reorganizing Egypt after the troubles of the Amarna period of Akhenaten's rule. However, after the death of Tutankhamun in 1352, military men seized the throne of Egypt and held it for the next thirty two years. An interesting side note to this was that, upon Tutankhamun's death, his wife sent a messenger to Suppiluliumas asking to marry one of his sons. Suspicious, as well he should have been, he first substantiated the origin of the request, before agreeing to send one of his sons to Egypt. What a windfall he must have felt this was, but we believe that it was probably Ay who discovered this treachery and had the son killed in route to Egypt. Ay then married Nefertiti to become one of Egypt's last pharaohs of the 18th Dynasty. Soon, Nefertiti disappeared from recorded history.
While the time was not yet ripe for a Syrian campaign, the empire did undergo a major shift in policy. Rule by proxy had clearly not worked for the Egyptians in vassal territory, so this policy was replaced by actual military occupation. Now, policy was often dictated by the military, and as early as the reign of general turned pharaoh, Horemheb, we see indications of a will to recover Egypt's lost territories and so regain the grandeur of the pre-Amarna period.
Probably in anticipation of renewed hostilities, Horemheb began to reestablish the old Hyksos capital at Avaris in the eastern delta, for this was an excellent locale from which to launch Syrian campaigns due to its proximity to routes leading to Canaan and Syria. Avaris became a forward operating base where Egyptian troops could rapidly be deployed to Syria. While Horemheb apparently never got around to launching such a campaign, his successor after the brief reign of Ramesses I, did just that.
It is clear that Ramesses I's successor Seti I had, from the very beginning, intentions of retrieving Egypt's position in Syria. He sought to recapture Egypt's greatness, even taking as one of his titles, "Repeater of Births, signaling a new era. Before the close of his first year on the Egyptian throne, he led an army into Palestine to eradicate a coalition of hostile Canaanite princes and continued north into Lebanon. Significantly, and setting a trend for the future, Pharaoh lead his army for perhaps the first time since the reign of Tuthmosis IV. During the Armarna period, military action had mostly involved minor campaigns, mostly police actions, but now, the full army would be welded by the king, personally.
He, as his son and successor, Ramesses II, took the policy of Tuthmosis III as their own in Asia. By his second year, he led an army northward to begin his offensive against the Hittite empire and the first battles between the two great kingdoms.
Today we can still see the records made of Seti's Syrian campaigns in the west wing of his war monument at Karnak. Here, he had recorded:
"...the ascent that Pharaoh...made in order to destroy the land of Kadesh and the land of Amurru".
We believe that he made good on at least one of these claims by a victory stela recovered from Kadesh that bears his name and evidencing the capture of the city by his Egyptian army. However, many scholars believe he never succeeded at this time in taking Amurru. Yet, with Kadesh in hand, he was able to stage campaigns into northern Syria where he met and defeated at least one Hittite army (though probably composed of vassal forces). That, given the gravity of this situation, the principal Hittite forces did not immediately take action has led some scholars to believe that they were occupied elsewhere, perhaps in Assyria. Indeed, the Hittite empire was having problems with its eastern neighbors, and may have had to tolerate Seti I's triumphs for a while.
Yet, indications as evidenced by the annals of Mursilis seem to point to Kadesh's return to Hittite hands prior to Seti I's death in 1304 BC, but if this was the result of a treaty, as some suggest, it was not to the liking of his son and successor, Ramesses II.
The first three years of Ramesses II's reign seem to have been marked by peace, but in his fourth year, and for reasons largely unknown to us, Amurru suddenly decided to defect back to Egyptian control. The new king appears to have quickly led an army northward in order to formally receive an oath of submission by the Amurru king, Benteshina.
Not at all oblivious to Egypt's aspirations in northern Syria, the new Hittite king, Muwatallish. recognized that in order to protect his holdings in Syria, particularly the strategic states of Aleppo and Carchemish, he would have to secure Kadesh. To his advantage, unlike the days of his father, there was no immediate Assyrian threat to distract him, so in the winter of 1301 BC, he set about organizing an army to recover Amurru and protect Kadesh. The venue of the coming conflict was never in doubt by either party. They would meet beneath the walls of Kadesh in one of the great battles of history in order to settle by trial of arms the future of their respective empires in Syria.
2009年10月31日 上午5點40分56秒The Pharaonic Village
The Pharaonic Village is Egypt's historic park. It's a unique place where Egypt's entire history is explained in 2 to 3 hours including our ancient history as well as our modern history. Visiting The Pharaonic Village is recommended to be at the beginning of the trip to Egypt. It is located on an island in the Nile, just 3 miles south of the center of Cairo. In this village you are transported by floating amphitheaters, and a hundred actors and actresses demonstrate scenes from ancient Egypt (Papyrus making, sculpting, home building….etc.).
In addition, the village has a complete replica of king Tutankhamun's tomb with all its treasures as well as 12 new museums, 4 related to ancient Egypt (mummification and medicine, pyramids building, arts and beliefs, ancient Egyptian boats) and 5 museums related to other periods in Egyptian history (Cleopatra's museum, Coptic history, Islamic civilization, Napoleon's expedition to Egypt, Egypt's modern history museum). There are also 3 museums related to our late three presidents, Mohamed Naguib, Nasser and Sadat).
Also the village is a wonderful place for children as it includes an interesting amusement park "Tut land", and an "Art Center". Also you can go on our Yacht "Nefertari" with which you can make a pleasant trip on the Nile.
The Official WebSite " The Pharaonic Village "
2009年10月31日 上午5點39分11秒Merenptah, the 4th King of Egypt's 19th Dynasty
Merenptah, the 4th King of Egypt's 19th Dynasty
By the time that Ramesses II died, he had apparently outlived twelve of his sons, so it was his 13th son, Merenptah who ascended the throne of Egypt. Merenptah was old himself by this time, probably nearly sixty years old, and his reign was rather dull, as well as short lived (perhaps only nine or ten years) in comparison with that of his father's reign. According to the Oxford History of Ancient Egypt, he ruled from 1213 until 1203 BC, while Clayton provides a reign from 1212 until 1202 BC.
Merenptah (also hetep-her-maat, and commonly also called Merneptah) was the king's birth name, meaning "Beloved of Ptah, Joyous is Truth). His throne name was Ba-en-re Mery-netjeru, which means "The Soul of Re, Beloved of the Gods". Merenptah was probably the fourth child of Ramesses II's second principle wife, Istnofret (Isisnofret). He was married to queens Istnofret (Isisnofret), who must have surely been his sister, and possibly a queen Takhat. His son was Seti-Merenptah, who probably ascended the throne sometime after his father as Seti II. However, Seti II's reign may have been initially usurped by a Amenmesse who may have been a son of Takhat, though Takhat's marriage to Merenptah is far from certain.
Merenptah is almost completely unknown until the 40th year of Ramesses II's reign. In fact he may have been heir to the throne of Egypt for about twelve years prior to Ramesses II's death, but in Ramesses II's year 40, we known the prince was made General of the Army. Perhaps it is not surprising that what we know of Merenptah's rule is mostly about his military activities. However, he appears not to have become the heir to the throne until Ramesses II's 55th regnal year, when Ramesses II was celebrating his 80th birthday, and Merenptah his 48th. In fact, in the last decade of Ramesses II's life, Merenptah was probably the real power behind the throne, as Ramesses II was well advanced in age.
Artist Portrait of what Merenptah may have looked like
In fact, he is mainly attested to by three great inscriptions, including 80 lines on a wall in the Temple of Amun at Karnak, a large stele with 35 readable lines from Athribis in the Delta and the great Victory Stele from his ruined mortuary temple at Thebes, with 28 lines. All of these text refer to his military campaigns.
The Victory Stele is unique. It was usurped by Merenptah from the mortuary temple of Amenhotep III at Thebes, and is dated to the third day of the third month of the third season so it may have been written around the summer of 1207. In it, Merenptah lists enemy conquests, but the most interesting reference is a very rare mention of Israel. It may be the oldest non biblical reference to that country. Because of this, Merenptah has often been thought to be the pharaoh of the Exodus, though modern opinion leans against such an identification. In part, the stele states that:
"The princes are prostrate saying: "Shalom!"
Not one of the Nine Bows lifts his head:
Tjehenu is vanquished, Khatti at peace,
Canaan is captive with all woe.
Ashkelon is conquered, Gezer seized,
Yanoam made nonexistent;
Israel is wasted, bare of seed,
Khor is become a widow for Egypt.
All who roamed have been subdued.
By the King of Upper and Lower Egypt, Banere-meramun,
Son of Re, Merenptah, Content with Maat,
Given life like Re every day."
Merenptah apparently did face a number of military problems. These included a "flash" revolt in Syria, which was quickly crushed. There were also problems on Egypt's western borders involving the southern Libyans and the Sea People, who apparently had silently infiltrated the Delta, and around year five of Merenptah's rule, attempted an invasion. However, with rapid mobilization of his forces and a pre-emptive strike, Merenptah was able to vanquish these enemies, apparently slaughtering many of them. Also, the Libyans apparently inspired the Nubians to the south to also revolt, but Merenptah's quick response to the Libyans allowed him to immediately turn south and inflict a crushing blow on those rebels as well.
However, Merenptah did attempt to maintain the peaceful relations of his father. The Hittite King in Syria faced a possible invasion from the north and widespread famine, so under the term of the treaty they had made with Ramesses II, they requested assistance from Merenptah, who provided them with much needed grain.
One interesting facet to Merenptah's reign was that he moved the administrative center for Egypt from Piramesse (Pi-Ramesse), his fathers capital, back to Memphis, where he constructed a royal palace next to the temple of Ptah. This palace was excavated in 1915 by the University of Pennsylvania Museum led by Clarence Fischer, and yielded fine architectural elements. 
Merenptah's tomb is number KV 8 located in the Valley of the Kings on the West Bank of Luxor (ancient Thebes). The king probably died around 1202 BC, but his mummy was not found within his tomb. In the 19th century, this apparently added to the speculation about him being the Pharaoh of the Exodus, since that king's body would have probably been washed away in the Red Sea. However, that theory was confounded when, in 1898, his mummy was discovered among 18 others in the mummy cache discovered in the tomb of Amenhotep II (KV 35).
He also built a mortuary temple that lies behind the Colossi of Memnon on the West Bank at Luxor. Much of it was built with stone robbed from the mortuary temple of Amenhotep III. The structure is currently being studied by Horst Jartz with the Swiss Institute in Cairo. Reports indicate that some of the fragments discovered include well preserved reliefs, perhaps some of the finest to be found in any temple at Thebes. The Egyptian Ministry of Culture has now decided to turn this complex into an open museum.
In addition to his tomb and temple we also know that he added to the Osireion at Abydos and also built at Dendera. Merenptah is further attested to by a "wall stele" at Amada, four almost identical stele from Nubia (at Amada, Amarah West, Wadi Sebua, Aksha), blocks from Elephantine, a decree from West Silsila, an inscription in the small temple of Medinet Habu, stele from Kom el-Ahmar and Hermopolis (along with other inscriptions), a victory column at Heliopolis, and several monument remains at Piramesse.
2009年10月31日 上午5點38分19秒Amun-her-shepeshef, First Son of Ramesses II
The First son of born to Ramesses the Great, was Amun-her-wenemef, meaning Amun Is on His Right Hand". The child's mother was Ramesses II's Great Wife, Nefertari. Had he outlived his father, he would have therefore become Pharaoh, the King of Egypt. Amun-her-wenemef came into the world while his father was still co-regent to his father, Seti I. Therefore, Amun-her-wenemef probably was the current king's first grandson.
When Ramesses II Ascended the throne of Egypt upon Set I's death, Amun-her-wenemef's name was changed to Amun-her-shepeshef, which means, "Amun Is with his Strong Arm". We do not know exactly why his name was changed, but it was not unique among Ramesses II's sons for him to do so, and he may have had other names as well. It was once thought that Seth-her-khepeshef was an individual son of Ramesses II, but current though on the matter is leaning to this being another name for Amun-her-shepeshef.
In fact, many names in the Egyptian royal family could change, for example, depending on what part of the country they were in. Hence, in Thebes, the prince might have been called Amun-her-khepeshef, but if he were in Memphis, where the principle god was Ptah, then he might have been called Ptah-her-khepeshef.
Amun-her-khepeshef had a number of titles, some of which were unique to him, as the heir apparent, but others that were shared by many of Ramesses II's other sons by principle wives. His titles included "Fan-bearer on the King's Right hand; Heir; Hereditary prince; Royal Scribe; Generalissimo (of His Majesty); Eldest and Bodily King;s Son; First King's Son; Commander of the Troops; Effective Confidant and Beloved of Him". He may have also had the titles, "Chief of the Secrets of the King's House; Lord in Charge of the Entire Land, Sem-priest of the Good God, Delegate and Judge of the Two lands, Controller of Lands Far-flung, if indeed he also has the name, Seth-her-khepeshef. These last titles were discovered on a stele in the eastern Delta site of Qantir.
Amun-her-khepeshef hunting with Ramesses II
Of all the sons, only he seems to have held the titles, "Effective Confidant" and "Commander of the Troops". Most of the other titles were held by one son or another. Of his unique titles, "Commander of the Troops" is the most interesting. Of course, the title indicates that he held a high military position, yet we hear little of him in battle after his father's early campaigns in Nubia and western Asia. He is depicted in battle within a number of well known scenes of the battle, but whether he actually took part in the military actions is still debated. Some Egyptologists believe he may have been a teenager, old enough to have actually took part in these battles. Others believe he was much younger and the scenes were only meant to enhance his image.
If he did take part in the battles, then he was in one of the best known campaigns in antiquity; the Battle of Kadesh. It was the first battle in history to have been well documented, because Ramesses II appears to have been very pleased with its victorious outcome, though if it was a glorious victory is more then a little debatable. However, it is very likely that Amun-her-khepeshef, along with his younger brother Khaemwese, did at least travel with their father to the battle, even if neither one of them physically engaged the enemy.
The Battle of Kadesh
Amun-her-shepeshef is actually well attested in scenes, but many of them or simply processions of sons and sometimes daughters. He is shown in processions with other brothers or sisters at the Temple at Abu Simbel, the Temple of Seti I at Abydos, the Temple of Derr, Luxor Temple, where a number of scenes are found, the Ramesseum on the West Bank at Luxor (ancient Thebes), and at Wadi es-Sebua, where he is shown in procession in two scenes. However, he is shown in a number of scenes that are more action oriented, such as hunting scenes with his father and several other brothers. These scenes may be found at the Temple of Abu Simbel where he and two other brothers are shown in war chariots and at Beit el-Wadi, where he and Khaemwese are also shown in chariots. At Karnak he is with eleven other brothers handling prisoners, while there is a similar scene at Luxor but with fewer brothers.
Amun-her-shepeshef in a war chariot
Unfortunately, Amun-her-shepeshef did not outlive his father. He died in year 40 of his father's reign. Amun-her-shepeshef was probably between the age of 40 and 45. In fact, Ramesses II outlived his first twelve sons, with Merenptah, the thirteenth who may probably have been sixty at the time, finally succeeding him. We believe that Amun-her-shepeshef was buried in KV 5 in the Valley of the Kings on the West Bank at Luxor. This huge and utterly unique tomb with over 150 chambers was most likely built for at least three or four of Ramesses II's sons, if not many more. Excavation in the tomb continues under the direction of one of the living legends of modern Egyptology, Kent Weeks. I am sure we can count on Dr. Weeks to painstakingly dig out ever shred of information that the tomb may yield, so one day we may know much more about this young prince of Egypt.